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The trade unions' instrumental role in four decades of successful popular resistance against subsidy removals is widely recognised, but insufficiently understood due to inadequate consideration of the particularities of labour. The subsidy contestations are considered a barometer of Nigerian politics, and the 2012 subsidy protests – often referred as Occupy Nigeria – was one of the largest popular mobilisations in Nigerian history. Whereas unionists described the outcome as a successful demonstration of popular sovereignty, other protesters blamed the unions for unfulfilled democratic opportunities and for succumbing to bribery. With labour theoretical perspectives, this article critically examines the trade unions' positions, actions and relations during those protests. The article demonstrates, in practice, not only how the unions' capacities to mobilise, strike and negotiate, were instrumental to the reinstatement of the subsidy, but also how trade unions' agency is both enabled and constrained by labour's multiple embeddedness in state, civil society and the market.

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Journal of Contemporary African Studies

ISSN: 0258-9001 (Print) 1469-9397 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjca20

Between the street and Aso Rock: the role of

Nigerian trade unions in popular protests

Camilla Houeland

To cite this article: Camilla Houeland (2017): Between the street and Aso Rock: the role

of Nigerian trade unions in popular protests, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, DOI:

10.1080/02589001.2017.1396297

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2017.1396297

Published online: 29 Oct 2017.

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Between the street and Aso Rock*: the role of Nigerian trade

unions in popular protests

Camilla Houeland

Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, The Norwegian University of

Life Sciences, NMBU, Ås, Norway

ABSTRACT

The trade unions' instrumental role in four decades of successful

popular resistance against subsidy removals is widely recognised,

but insufficiently understood due to inadequate consideration of

the particularities of labour. The subsidy contestations are

considered a barometer of Nigerian politics, and the 2012 subsidy

protests – often referred as Occupy Nigeria – was one of the

largest popular mobilisations in Nigerian history. Whereas

unionists described the outcome as a successful demonstration of

popular sovereignty, other protesters blamed the unions for

unfulfilled democratic opportunities and for succumbing to

bribery. With labour theoretical perspectives, this article critically

examines the trade unions' positions, actions and relations during

those protests. The article demonstrates, in practice, not only how

the unions' capacities to mobilise, strike and negotiate, were

instrumental to the reinstatement of the subsidy, but also how

trade unions' agency is both enabled and constrained by labour's

multiple embeddedness in state, civil society and the market.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 18 March 2015

Accepted 5 July 2017

KEYWORDS

Nigeria; trade unions; labour

agency; social movements;

fuel subsidy; protests

The series of contestations over the ' price of petrol at the pump' is an ' excellent barometer

to track the ebbs and flows of Nigerian politics' (Obadare and Adebanwi 2013 , 2). The

union-led mobilisation against fuel subsidy removal have brought about ' remarkable

returns' by successfully resisting the regular government attempts since 1978 to deregu-

late the fuel-price, as well as by influencing and formalising the Nigerian governance

system (Okafor 2009b ). Since analyses of the unions' roles in these protests rarely

approaches them as labour, considering the particularities of trade unions, our scholarly

understandings of Nigerian labour is inadequate.

The aim of this article is to deepen our understanding of the Nigerian trade unions' roles

and relations, and of their opportunities and constraints, through a case study of the 2012

protests against another subsidy removal. These protests constituted one of the largest

popular mobilisations in Nigerian history, often referred to as Occupy Nigeria (Branch

and Mampilly 2015 ). The instrumental roles of the Nigerian unions in this are widely

acknowledged, but also contested. Through concepts of labour agency and power, this

© 2017 The Institute of Social and Economic Research

CONTACT Camilla Houeland camilla.houeland@nmbu.no; camilla.houeland@gmail.com Department of Inter-

national Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, The Norwegian University of Life Sciences, NMBU, P.O. Box 5003,

Ås 1432, Norway

*Aso Rock is the popular name of the office and residence of the Nigerian President.

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN STUDIES, 2017

https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2017.1396297

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article engages with concrete contradictions and contentions between trade unions and

other protesters in the 2012 protests. This approach provides new perspectives on a key

political actor and on a significant historical event in Nigeria. Additionally, the article con-

tributes to filling a general a research gap on African trade unions.

When President Goodluck Jonathan removed the fuel subsidies on January 1, 2012, the

official pump price increased from 65 Nigerian Naira, NGN (0.40 USD) to 141 NGN (0.86

USD) per litre. After two weeks of intense mobilisation, street protests and strike action,

the President buckled and restored the subsidy, with a new selling price at 97 NGN per

litre. The same day, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and Trade Union Congress

(TUC) suspended the general strike. The NLC-President, Abdulwahed Omar, framed the

outcome as a popular victory and held that ' no government or institution will take Niger-

ians for granted again' (BBC 2012 ). However, not all protesters were content. 'Nonlabor

activists howled with anger that labour leaders had again been " settled" (i.e. bribed)

into a deal that squandered a golden opportunity for fundamental democracy-building

concessions' (Kew and Oshikoya 2014 , 7). The critique assumes that the unions could

have acted differently and achieved more; that they had not sufficiently exhausted their

potential policy space and their capacities. This concerns the question of labour agency

and power. Whereas labour power describes labours' inherent capacity to mobilise,

strike and negotiate, labour agency concerns labour' s contextual ability and willingness

to apply these capacities.

This case study is based on literature and media analysis, as well as interviews with

union leaders and other key actors in the protests during field visits in 2012 and 2013.

The focus is on the NLC, the largest and oldest trade union confederation with over

four million members, predominantly blue-collar workers. In addition, there is reference

to the TUC with about 300,000 white-collar worker members, and the two oil workers'

unions, the NLC-affiliated NUPENG (Nigerian Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas

Workers), with approximately 10,000 members, and the TUC-affiliated PENGASSAN (Pet-

roleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria), with about 20,000 members

(Houeland 2015).

The first section reflects on the role of African unions in African and labour studies,

before it considers the particularity of trade unions' through the concepts of agency

and power. Labour agency and power depend on labour' s relation to state, market and

civil society, and on how the trade unions' strategically navigate in these arenas. The

second section historically situates the Nigerian trade unions' roles and positions in

relation to the three arenas. In this history, the fuel subsidy is critical. The fuel subsidy

binds together the three principle arenas of state, market and civil society. The third

section reflects on key policy issues around the fuel subsidy at the time of the 2012 pro-

tests. The fourth section details and analyses the unfolding of, and controversies around,

the 2012 protests, before the last sections draws concludes from the research findings.

African labour, social movements and labour studies

There has been a dramatic decline in academic interest in African labour since Freund

(1984 , 1) stated 30 years ago that ' [no] subject has in recent years so intruded into the

scholarly literature on Africa as the African worker' . The decline relates not only to the mul-

tiple trade union crises following the economic liberalisations since the late 1970s, but also

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to unfulfilled ideological expectations, and the post-cold-war discreditation of socialism

that had guided labour and labour scholars (Burawoy 2009 ; Webster, Lambert, and Beziu-

denhout 2011).

At the same time, social movement scholars frequently included trade unions in their

studies, although by ignoring the particulars and multiple roles of labour, many failed

to comprehend the roles of trade unions (Engels 2015 ; Webster, Lambert, and Beziudenh-

out 2011 ). A union is neither simply a collective workers' organisation for improved

working conditions operating in the work place, nor simply a part of a larger social move-

ment operating in the social and political spheres (Fantasia and Stepan-Norris 2004 ). As

institutions ' [trade unions] operate as units of social integration, bargaining tool and pro-

ducer of social compromise. But as social movements, they are also part of social conflicts

and contentious politics' (Obono 2011 , 97). In contrast to single issue protests, trade

unions are continuous organisations with long-term perspectives (Engels 2015 ). Compared

to other social movement organisations, trade unions have a different kind of bureaucracy,

relate directly and institutionally to state and capital through a range of economic, legal

and political relations, and have ' unusually powerful opponents' (Fantasia and Stepan-

Norris 2004 , 571).

A' militant, innovative and progressive' type of unionism characterised by social alli-

ances and confrontations with the state was recognised in South Africa, South Korea

and Brazil in the 1980s, and was termed social movement unionism (SMU) (von Holdt

2002, 284). These social movement unions inspired a renewal in labour studies that com-

bined social movement theories and labour theories (Webster, Lambert, and Beziudenh-

out 2011 ). Whereas earlier labour scholars often held Western theoretical and Marxist

ideological biases, and hence failed to identify the precise roles of African unions

(Cooper 1995 ; Freund 1984 ), renewed labour perspectives opened up far more context-

sensitive and complex frameworks for understanding trade unions. Although SMU-strat-

egies are associated with the global South, even if they' re also identified in the US and

Europe (Burawoy 2009 ; Frege, Heery, and Turner 2004 ), the related theoretical approaches

have rarely been employed with regard to African countries other than South Africa.

Labour agency, power, and strategic dilemmas

The particularity of trade unions defines their capacities, choices as well as its limitations:

their agency and power. Agency is an actor' s capacity for wilful and purposeful action

(Jasper 2004 ), and labour agency is about ' how acts of defiance, strike and protest by

ordinary men and women can change economic landscapes' (Coe and Jordhus-Lier

2011, 228). A subjective and reflexive understanding of agency acknowledges not only

the actor' s capacity to act, but considers their choice to either use or not use these

capacities. Power specifies actors' capacities as a form of inherent potential in the actor

and is ' located in agents, individual or collective' or ' attached to the agency that operates

within and upon structures' (Hayward and Lukes 2008 , 7, 11). Labour power is the inherent

types of actions and abilities available to trade unions. The two core labour powers are

associational and structural power, or the ability to mobilise, strike and bargain (Silver

2003; Wright 2000).

Associational power is about workers' capability to mobilise, resulting ' from the for-

mation of collective organizations of workers' (Wright 2000 , 962). Most often this refers

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to the mobilisation into trade unions, but it can also refer to the formation of political

(labour) parties, or to tactical trade union alliances in the surrounding community (Silver

2003; Wright 2000).

Structural power is associated with the ability to hurt the economy through strikes, and

to bargain, and it ' results simply from the location of workers within the economic system'

(Wright 2000 , 962). There are two kinds of structural power: Market bargaining power

depends on the labour market, where labour power is higher in a tight labour market

with few available workers. Workplace bargaining power concerns the strategic location

of a certain group of workers within the production chain. A local work stoppage can

cause widespread disruption (Wright 2000).

The incorporation of associational and structural power into institutions can be termed

institutional power, and is about the ability of trade unions to ensure regulation of rights

and to influence governance regimes. This may take the form of a labour law, wage-setting

mechanisms, bargaining arrangements, or other institutionalised dialogue systems

between labour, government, and/or employers (Webster 2015 ). Importantly, institutional

power both grants and limits rights, both provides and limits spaces of action.

Agency is contextual and relational, and labour agency is conditioned by how it is

embedded in state, market, community, and in history (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011;

Serdar 2012 ). Combining labour agency and power, we can say that a union's agency is

derived from its structural position in the market, its capacity to mobilise workers (and

in the wider community), and its institutional access to and influence over actors in the

state. A trade union must relate to all the three principle arenas, but they tend to prioritise

one arena, or an axis between two, depending on both ideology and opportunity (Hyman

2001). When determining how to prioritise engagement in these arenas, Hyman (2001, 17)

suggests that trade unions face ' persistent tensions between political action and 'econo-

mism' ; between militancy and accommodation; and between broad class orientation and

narrower sectional concerns'.

In the market, workers are both producers and consumers. Trade unions organise

workers to articulate collective claims, primarily regarding working conditions and job

security. A trade union represents workers' claims as well as disciplines workers in order

to ensure they adhere to a collective agreement (Lier 2007 ). An economistic strategy

narrows trade union activity to the workplace and sees political and social engagements

as disruptive. Workers and employers are considered as sharing overall interests in profit

maximisation, while they have opposing interests in the division of profits (Hyman 2001).

The state is a regulator of labour markets and of workers' lives through laws and by pro-

viding welfare services that influence labour conditions, such as taxation, health services

and pensions (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011 ). In most countries, the state is the biggest

employer. Reformist unions emphasise social dialogue mechanisms, and see themselves

as a vehicles for social integration. They believe in gradual improvement in social welfare

through political reform and cooperation with both state and capital (Hyman 2001).

Workers are part of the larger community as reproducers and consumers, and unions

form part of organised civil society (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011 ). In this arena, the key

roles of unions are to promote social justice and mobilise discontent, oftentimes by

taking joint action in alliances with other actors. Radical unions see their role as part of

a larger class alliance in conflict with the state and capitalist system (Hyman 2001 ). The

SMU-strategy, associated with broad social alliance and confrontational approaches

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towards the state and capital is often described (and romanticised) as desirable, new, inno-

vative, radical and militant, but can also be a pragmatic way for unions to recast their

mobilising power when workers are excluded from state and market structures (Silver

2003; Webster, Lambert, and Beziudenhout 2011). Importantly, a social alliance strategy

carries potential tensions over strategies both within the union and between the unions

and their allies, particularly over decision-making and representation (Fairbrother and

Webster 2008 ; Hyman 2001 ). The Nigerian trade unions' actions during the 2012 protests

was a form of SMU.

Situating Nigerian unions historically

Nigerian unions are both constituted by, and constitutive of, structures and actors in state,

market, and civil society (Andrae and Beckman 1998 ; Kew 2016 ). Although governments

have attempted to control the unions through both law and direct repression, and the

unions' relation to the state has been ambivalent, the modus operandi of the unions

has been that of resistance and mass mobilisation. In this, the mobilisation against fuel

price hikes is central.

Fuelled by the exponential increase of oil revenues during the two decades following

independence in 1960, the Nigerian state expanded investments in industrialisation and

welfare. In 1966, the government decided to subsidise refined petroleum products to

ensure low fuel prices for all Nigerians. By 1977, Nigeria was the worlds' seventh largest

oil producer, and the skyrocketing international oil prices in 1970s brought economic opti-

mism, opportunity and employment. Between 1964 and 1981, the wage labour force

increased almost ten-fold to 9,6 million (Viinikka 2009 ). Trade union membership grew

rapidly, but the unions were fragmented. By 1978, there were four confederations and

985 industrial unions. The unions were divided ideologically, as well as along personal

and regional divisions, which threatened to destabilise them and made them ineffective

(Akinlaja 1999 ; Andrae and Beckman 1998).

Attempting to control the unions, in 1978 President Olusegun Obasanjo enforced a mili-

tary decree that allowed only one confederation and one union per industry: The NLC, and

42 industrial unions and senior associations. The unions were already discussing mergers for

unity, and workers mostly supported the law. The monopoly, automatic union membership

and check-off dues became a platform for strength through unity, increased membership,

and financial independence (Akinlaja 1999; Andrae and Beckman 1998 ). The law,

however, limited labour rights, and divided labour organisationally along class lines: Only

blue-collar workers were allowed unionisation, whereas white-collar workers were con-

strained to organise in 'associations' that could not undertake trade unions actions such

as strikes. Nevertheless, most senior associations considered themselves as trade unions,

and acted accordingly. Also, despite the law, government failed to control the NLC. At the

first NLC-congress, the government-preferred candidate for NLC-Presidency lost elections

to the 'progressive' Marxist, Hassan Sunmonu. As soon as 1981, the NLC held a successful

general strike, and the government expressed regrets over the law, and actively supported

attempts to create competing (and illegal) union structures (Otobo 1981 ).

The international oil crisis of the late 1970s hit Nigeria with particular force. Since the

early 1970s, oil revenues have contributed to 70%-80% of the national revenue budget.

This has created a deep oil dependency and vulnerabilities for both the state and Nigerian

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elites, and it has fuelled corruption and individual abuses of the state (Joseph 1987 ; Obi

2014). Although multinational companies dominate the Nigerian oil industry, the state

is a key market actor not only as regulator, but also as an industrial actor through joint ven-

tures and through the national oil company, NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corpor-

ation). When international oil prices plummeted, the government needed to take drastic

actions to downsize the bloated state. Since 1978, and with particular force since the 1986

structural adjustment programme (SAP), reducing or removing the fuel subsidy has been a

key component of liberalising the economy (Ibrahim and Unom 2011 ). However, all the

attempts to deregulate the fuel price mechanism by cutting the subsidy have been

resisted by trade union-led coalitions (Okafor 2009b).

Dramatic rise in unemployment reduced trade unions' associational power from direct

membership, but the ability to mobilise also links to having formal membership and

nationwide structures. Furthermore, the economic crisis radicalised workers, and the

unions expanded associational power through social alliances. Since the mid-1980s, the

NLC took a leading role in civil society. They mobilised for bread-and-butter-issues and

democracy, simultaneously resisting political oppression, authoritarianism, and anti-

labour liberal reforms, such as privatisation and downsizing of the state (Adesina 1994;

Aiyede 2004 ; Andrae and Beckman 1998 ; Falola and Heaton 2008 ). With eroding welfare

benefits in health and education, and rising poverty and inequalities in the midst of

elite corruption, Nigerians saw cheap fuel as a rightful share of the oil revenue (Guyer

and Denzer 2013 ). For workers with reduced bargaining power over wages, ensuring

low fuel price was about hindering inflation in consumer prices and preserving a certain

real wage value.

In addition, the Nigerian unions have strong structural power: Wage workers have a

strategic position in relation to the modern economy and the state, which the unions

have translated into political leadership and direction to a wider range of popular demo-

cratic forces (Beckman 2009 ). That oil workers have a particularly strong structural power is

clear, as a strike in the oil industry could upset the financial fabric of the state and its elites,

as well as the economy (Houeland 2015 ). The absence of democracy, and ideologically pol-

itical opposition, created a combination of political space and popular demand for trade

unions to play a role in filling the gap.

The 1988 anti-fuel subsidy protest was particularly big, and soon afterwards President

Babangida dissolved the NLC under the pretext that the attempt to organise an alternative

union federation by a rivalling fraction of reformists was against the 1978 labour law

(Adesina 2000 ; Olukoshi and Aremu 1988 ). Olukoshi and Aremu (1988 , 110) propose

that the dissolution was Babangida' s attempt to ' pave the way for the " smooth"

removal of the oil "subsidy " and the unchallenged implementation of other elements of

SAP' . The state-controlled NLC-congress in 1988 safeguarded the election of a moderate

NLC-president who was close to Babangida, Pascal Bafyau (Adesina 2000 ; Beckman and

Lukman 2010 ; Olukoshi and Aremu 1988).

The June 12 1993 elections were supposed to mark the transition to democracy.

Moshood Abiola won the Presidential election by 58%, and President Babangida' s sub-

sequent election annulment sparked widespread fury. However, NLC remained passive,

allegedly because Abiola had not selected the NLC-president, Bafyau, as his running

mate (Akinlaja 1999 ). The oil unions, with NUPENG in front, took the lead in the following

resistance (Adesina 2000 ; Akinlaja 1999 ; Kew 2016 ; Viinikka 2009 ). Protests and strikes

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broke out throughout the country, and although the Campaign for Democracy (CD) had a

leading role in this, Viinikka (2009 , 142) asserts that ' the Nigerian working class was the

force that swept away Babangida' . Babangida, however, did not hand over power to

Abiola, but to an interim government under Ernest Shonekan in August 1993. Soon after-

wards, Shonekan removed the fuel subsidy, and the resistance was fierce. The oil unions

again took the lead, while consistent demands from the grassroots pressed the NLC to call

for a general strike. Shonekan was forced into negotiations with the unions, and conceded

on the fuel subsidy (Adesina 2000 ). The victory backfired, however. Although it led to 'the

collapse of [the Shonekan government] it ushered in the most dictatorial and corrupt mili-

tary regime in the history of Nigeria [… ] the Abacha regime' (Nwoko 2009 : 147). Abacha

did not attempt any further subsidy reductions (Akanle et al. 2014).

On June 12 1994, Abiola claimed the presidency, only to be arrested. NUPENG initiated

the longest strike in Nigerian history. Again, rather than democratic concessions, Abacha

banned the NLC and both oil unions, set the three union structures under sole administra-

tors, and arrested the oil union leaders, Frank Kokori and Milton Dabibi. Only when Abacha

died in 1998 were the union leaders released and trade unions legalised.

The elections in 1999 introduced the current electoral democracy. The first President,

Obasanjo (1999– 2007), started off with concessions to labour, including major wage

increases (Kew and Oshikoya 2014 ). Yet inflation was higher than wage increases and,

despite economic growth since 1999, there was little economic improvement for the

Nigerian majority, and unemployment kept growing. Wage employment decreased

from 15% of the workforce in 1999 to 10% in 2006 (Treichel 2010 ). With an estimated

labour force of just below 60 million (CIA 2016 ), and a low degree of informal sector union-

isation, a combined membership of NLC and TUC of 4,5 million suggest a high union

density. Even so, the bargaining power of the Nigerian unions is limited, and NLC has con-

tinued alliance politics and mass mobilisation.

Unionists underscore that, when forming alliances, they collaborate only with labour-

friendly, representative, community-based organisations that share their ideologies and

policy positions (P. Esele, personal communication, August 30, 2012; D. Yaqub, personal

communication, August 30, 2012). The liberalisations of the state and economy from

the mid 1980s reduced not only the power of the unions, but also of their traditional

union allies, such as the student movement (Osaghae 1995 ). While democratic spaces

have opened since 1999 and increased the roles and numbers of non-state actors

(Falola and Heaton 2008 ), the emerging nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are not

necessarily natural alliance partners to the unions. Many NGOs, including democracy

and human rights organisations, lean on liberalist ideologies and are anti-state, in contrast

to the socialist leaning unions that actively work in and towards the state (Adunbi 2016;

Kew 2016 ). The trade unions' civil society partnership was formalised in 2005 with the

establishment of Labour and Civil Society Coalition (LASCO). In LASCO, NLC and TUC rep-

resent organised workers, whereas the Joint Action Front (JAF) represents non-labour

actors. These partners have cooperated on various issues, including elections, corruption

and transparency, minimum wage and pension (D. Yaqub, personal communication,

August 30, 2012). However, the resistance against the fuel subsidy has been the main

mobilisation issue. There were six subsidy removal attempts and resistances between

1999 and 2007.

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The relationship between NLC' s and President Obasanjo soured with the continued

subsidy removal resistance. In a new attempt to curtail labour power, Obasanjo again

amended the labour law in 2005. Whereas in 1978 he attempted to control the unions

through monopolisation, the 2005 law opened for fragmentation and mushrooming of

unions by revoking that monopoly. Although the law opened for freedom of association

by allowing white-collar workers and TUC to register formally as trade unions, the law con-

strained international labour rights, among others by banning political strikes (Okafor

2009a,2009b), such as the fuel subsidy strikes.

With democracy, access to state institutions opened for the unions. The unions have

representation on various government committees and public policy forums, and

unions are consulted on major reforms, such as the privatisation of electricity. Notably,

many unionists questioned the effect of their participation in these arenas, and these

relations are the foundation for accusations of co-optation by the state. Whereas President

Mashood Yar' Adua (2007– 2010) established social dialogue systems and promised regular

minimum salary negotiations, the President Jonathan regime was less available for labour

(Lakemfa 2015).

2012 protests: policy positions on the fuel subsidy

The 2012 fuel subsidy removal came at a time of economic growth and expanded demo-

cratic spaces, and under a relatively weak and unpopular president (Campbell 2013 ). To

understand the protest dynamics during the 2012 protests, this section examines the pol-

itical and moral economy of the fuel subsidy, considering policy issues and different actors'

agendas.

Subsidy as a blockage to development

The Nigerian government had support and pressure from the international financial insti-

tutions, bilateral donors, and the private sector to remove the fuel subsidy (Ibrahim and

Unom 2011 ). These actors insisted that the subsidies were financially unsustainable and

blocked public investments in infrastructure, welfare and pro-poor targeted policies. In

2011, one-third of the national budget was for the fuel subsidy. Deregulation would

open for private investments, in particular in the downstream oil sector, which could

create sorely needed jobs and restore the refinery capacity. Officially, Nigeria had 23%

unemployment. Despite being the largest oil producer on the continent – with production

at about 2 million barrels a day – Nigeria imported 90% of its refined petroleum products.

The four state-owned refineries had long been neglected and were beset by corruption,

and only ran at about 40% capacity (Africa Confidential 2012a).

The Nigerian trade unions held restoration and expansion of the refinery capacity for

jobs creation and national value addition to the economy high on their agenda. While

the oil industry is capital- and technology-intensive, and creates few jobs, most of the

jobs are in the downstream sector, where refineries are the mainstay. Even though the

Nigerian union movement, and in particular the NLC, is associated with anti-privatisation

and anti-deregulation, there are internal ideological divisions: The ' progressives' were prin-

cipled against privatisation, while the ' democrats' were more open to deregulation (Akin-

laja 1999 ; Kew 2016 ). Adams Oshiomole, the NLC-President who led the six subsidy strikes

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between 1999 and 2007, was never against privatisation as such (Okafor 2009a ). The TUC

and both oil workers' unions believe deregulation would open up the country for invest-

ments, and encourage efficiency and job creation (P. Esele, personal communication,

August 30, 2012; A. Olowoshile, personal communication, September 10, 2012). And

when NLC revised its policy on the fuel subsidy in 2009, it decided to support conditional

deregulation (J. Odah, personal communication, September 14, 2012). This implies that

fuel subsidies must continue until the government has proven implementation of devel-

opment investments and restored the refineries. Before this, the unions would continue

resisting subsidy removals (P. Esele, personal communication, August 30, 2012).

Subsidy as source of corruption

The subsidy system was a major source of corruption, and the government and its suppor-

ters held that removing the subsidy would be an efficient tool to fight corruption. Techni-

cally, the subsidy is about the state defining a fixed selling price of fuel, and compensating

market vendors for the difference between the import and selling price. The endemic

subsidy-related corruption is linked especially to the state-owned oil company, NNPC,

which had an interest in every aspect of the subsidy regime as owner the refineries and

most of the oil related infrastructure, as importation licensor and as the main importer

of refined petroleum products (Ibrahim and Unom 2011 ). The Nigerian Extractive Industry

Transparency Initiative audit report for 2009– 2011 revealed that the NNPC had illegally

paid itself 1.4 NGN trillion between 2009 and 2011 (Amaefule 2013).

Anti-corruption was a fundamental driver of the 2012 protests, but the protesters jointly

rejected the alleged fiscal problems, arguing instead that the largest share of the budget-

ary ' subsidy costs' was in reality elite mismanagement and corruption (Bakare 2012;

A. Omar, personal communication, June 8, 2012). The protesters held that removing the

subsidy would not resolve the systemic corruption, but merely change the nature of cor-

ruption. Jonathan had recently spent large sums to safeguard the 2011 elections, and his

administration suffered from legitimacy and cash deficiencies (Campbell 2013).

Subsidy as a welfare benefit and workers issue

Supporters of removing the subsidy argued that the prime beneficiaries of the subsidy

were the middle classes, since they consume disproportionate amounts of fuel products.

Following that argument, Poul Collier (2012 ) considered that the 2012 ' protests closely

resemble the sad folly of the Tea Party: poor people tricked into lobbying for greedy elites'.

As in earlier strikes (Guyer and Denzer 2013 ; Okafor 2009a ), the unions and protesters

insisted that the subsidy was a workers' issue and a benefit to the poor, and that it was

both morally just and financially viable. The importance of cheap fuel to the poor was

evident in the protest slogan ' Kill corruption, not Nigerians' . Despite the country' s vast

oil resources and economic growth, inequality and poverty was rising, and the Nigerian

majority experienced little in the way of welfare benefits – apart from the cheap fuel.

Fuel price increase has an immediate inflationary impact on the price of transport, food,

medicine and energy. The 2012 subsidy removal came as the unions were fighting for

the implementation of the 2011 agreed-upon minimum wage of 18,000 NGN (USD 110).

The doubling of the fuel price threatened the real wage value, with particularly

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devastating effects for the poorest workers. Furthermore, the subsidy is important for job

security, as small and medium size businesses and large parts of the informal sector

depend on fuel-driven generators (A. Omar, personal communication, June 8, 2012).

Dynamics of the 2012 subsidy resistance

It was no surprise that unions and civil society organisations threatened strikes and street

protests when in October 2011, the Nigerian Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala

announced that the government would remove the fuel subsidies in April 2012. Respond-

ing to the threats, the government initiated bilateral dialogues with civil society actors.

What was a surprise, and an added provocation, was President Jonathan' s choice to

remove the subsidy on January 1. This ignored the ongoing dialogue; and it was at the

end of the holiday season when many Nigerians were short of money and facing the trans-

port price hikes in their villages. The President may have hoped the timing would hinder

mobilisation, but the following day spontaneous street protests broke out. On January 4,

NLC and TUC jointly declared a general strike for January 9. After two days of negotiations,

Presidential Jonathan announced the restoration of the subsidy and a new selling price of

97 Naira, and the unions suspended the strike on January 16. The unions were criticised for

not consulting fellow protesters and for selling out to government (Abah 2012 ; Bassey

2012; Ibrahim 2012).

Associational power: contested representation and lost control

The 2012 protests were among the largest in Nigerian history (Branch and Mampilly 2015).

Although the unions again took a leading position, the increased mobilisation was not

simply an expansion of the unions' associational power. New political and social actors

were instrumental to the mobilisation, but also brought mixed agendas and challenged

the unions' representational legitimacy.

The increased mobilisation was enabled by the opened democratic space since 1999;

fuelled by the unpopularity of President Jonathan and by a growing political opposition;

provoked by rising poverty and inequality; and inspired by the global protests waves of

the Arab Spring, the Occupy Movement and a series of African uprisings (Branch and Mam-

pilly 2015 ). Although mostly depicted as a single protest, it is more fruitful to see protests

and strikes as parallel events that were only partly coordinated. There are no reliable or

accurate numbers on how many attended the street protests in cities around the

country, but photos and videos show packed crowds and the media in general referred

to ' thousands' or ' hundreds of thousands'. The largest street gatherings were in Lagos,

where the Occupy Nigeria and the Save Nigeria Group (SNG) dominated.

The media dubbed the protests ' Occupy Nigeria' , inspired by the loose, online move-

ment or network of individuals and groups that identified with that name (Kew and Oshi-

koya 2014 ). By active use of social media, Occupy Nigeria brought new actors to the

protest scene. Branch and Mampilly (2015 ) emphasise that informal, unemployed and

unorganised people drove the protests, whereas others, such as Orji (2016 ), emphasise

the middle classes and their social media approach to activism as key. Although some

trade unionists identified and engaged with the Occupy movement, (J. Gaskia, personal

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communication, September 2, 2012), most unionists called the protests by different

names, such as the fuel subsidy protests or the January uprising.

Both unions and Occupy Nigeria had an urban bias, but whereas Occupy was strongest

in Lagos, Kano and Abuja, the unions have structures throughout the country. Occupy

Nigeria was flexible which enabled them to act fast, and some criticised the unions for

rigid systems and slow reactions. Unionists explained this with reference to their represen-

tational, democratic procedures for decision-making, and their time- and resource-con-

suming procedures for preparation of strike action. In turn, the unions were critical of

Occupy Nigeria' s lack of structures, representational mandate, and unclear leadership.

NLC' s assistant General Secretary, Denja Yaqub, (personal communication, August 30,

2012) noted between four to seven different Occupy Nigeria groups. In Abuja alone,

there were several different protest points (H. Abdu, personal communication, April 2,

2013).

The 2012 NLC leadership was less experienced, and politically and administratively

weaker than under previous strikes. Whereas the charismatic, Oshiomole (NLC-President

1999– 2007) brought extensive experience with mobilisation and negotiations from the

vibrant textile union, the ' soft-spoken' Omar (NLC-President 2007– 2015) came from the

teachers' union, with poor negotiation and recruitment systems. Moreover, key NLC-

staff had recently been dismissed after a crisis around the 2011 NLC-congress. The Van-

guard' s labour editor, Funmi Komolafe, (personal communication, September 4, 2012),

held that ' due largely to what I would call some sort of failure on the side of leadership

of the main unions, they allowed such a gap that the civil society took over the leadership

role in the struggle'.

The contestation over the results was also about the actual agenda. The subsidy

removal ignited the protests, but they were intrinsically about democracy, inequality

and corruption. While protesters agreed on the general issues, the specific aims were

more unclear. Whereas the unions had technical and detailed policies on the subsidies

(Ibrahim and Unom 2011 ), Occupy Nigeria had ' no plan' (O. Adeniyi, personal communi-

cation, April 2, 2013). A particular controversy arose regarding regime change. Placards

with ' Jonathan must go' appeared mostly in Lagos, and was associated with the leader

of Save Nigeria Group (SNG), the charismatic Pastor Tunde Bakare. The SNG spokesperson,

Yinka Odukamkin (personal communication, September 9, 2012) confirmed that the SNG

indeed wanted, and saw the opportunity for, regime change. However, this was controver-

sial within SNG and Bakare – who ran as vice presidential candidate for the opposition

party in 2011 – who was temporarily expelled from SNG for politicising the protests

(The Tide 2012).

The trade unions were against regime change. With the institutional memory of how

the 1993/1994-strikes paved the way for the brutal Abacha' s regime instead of enforcing

democracy, the TUC President Peter Esele noted (personal communication, August 30,

2012):

Things were getting out of hand, opening for anti-democratic forces. [Unions demanded a

reversal to fuel price of N65] but we will not support any attempt to undermine the consti-

tution, which would result in a military coup.

The Nigerian government was alerted by the national security situation, where Boko

Haram had recently expanded its terror attacks from the Northeast to Abuja, as well as

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by the regime changes following the Arab Spring. The subsidy protesters were met with

arrests and violence from police and the army, and 16 casualties were reported (National

Mirror 2013). NLC evacuated as soldiers closed the streets around their Labour House in

Abuja. Union leaders felt pressured from the state and the international community, but

also from members and allies, to end the strike (Lakemfa 2015 ). When suspending the

strike on January 16, the union leaders referred to the security situation and rumours of

a general state of emergency (O. Lakemfa, personal communication, September 13,

2012), claiming that ' the security forces had been ordered to use all means to end protests'

(BBC 2012).

Structural power and its limitation: shutting down the economy

When Branch and Mampilly (2015 , 110) hold that labour (and SNG) ' comprised a relatively

small portion of the actual protesters' , they seem to have a bias on the presence in the

street at the expense of absence from work. As much as the street protests had been

ongoing, the strike from January 9 marked ' the nationwide phase of the mass protests;

and in essence the birth of the January Uprising!' (Jaiye Gaskia, ' The betrayal then and

the betrayal now' , Sarah Reporters, 2013). The strike was critical of the outcome: ' Govern-

ment was brought to its knees, not because of the wide reaching civil society network […]

but because of the unions'(F. Komolafe, personal communication, September 4, 2012).

However, the capacity and will to strike have limitations.

Workers who did not go to work did not necessarily attend street rallies. In certain areas,

such as Yobe and Borno State, workers stayed away from work, but there was no street

action due to the terror threat from Boko Haram (Lakemfa 2015 ). In Port Harcourt, the

capital of the Niger Delta oil region, though many workers stayed away from work only

a few individual unionists joined the street protests. The regional TUC-chairperson,

Chika Onuegbu (personal communication, March 29, 2014) explained that ' if we sit

down dancing and the oil is flowing, we are sabotaging the strike', suggesting that the

success of the protests was not determined in the streets but by shutting down the

economy. The fact that President Jonathan invited the unions to negotiate only once PEN-

GASSAN threatened to shut down oil-production on January 12, stresses the importance of

the structural power of unions in general and of oil workers in particular.

Many oil union members, such as truckers and office staff, did go on strike, but oil pro-

duction was not shut down. Other protesters criticised the oil unions for ' empty threats'

(Abah 2012 ). It is common to await the outcome of negotiations before work stoppage.

More important is that a work stoppage in upstream production can threaten job security

due to the technical nature of production and the extreme costs associated with restarting

production (P. Esele, personal communication, August 30, 2012; B. Olowoshile, personal

communication, September 10, 2012; P. Akpatason, personal communication, September

1, 2012). According to these oil union leaders, it could take up to a year to restart pro-

duction, which would devastate the national economy and endanger jobs. Upstream pro-

duction has actually never been shut down in earlier political strikes, not even during the

infamous 1993/1994-strikes (Akinlaja 1999 ). The then General Secretary of NUPENG, Frank

Kokori explained that tactically:

[D]isrupting the upstream operations [… ] never achieves immediate impact. [It] would only

affect government after about a month, [… ]. But with the downstream operations collapsing

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when the refineries and the tanker drivers stop working, the impact breaks out within 14 hours

(Kokori 2014 , 79).

Thus, in a political strike, the critical structural or workplace bargaining power is not

necessarily in the upstream but rather the downstream sector (see also Houeland 2015).

Furthermore, in 2012 there was a higher security risk, and lower protests support in the

region where a strike would hurt the most: the oil producing Niger Delta (Houeland 2015;

Lakemfa 2015 ). Protests were particularly strong in areas run by politicians in opposition to

the Jonathan regime, and many read the protests as ' anti-Jonathan' . In contrast to the Pre-

sident' s weak popular support and contested position within the People 's Democratic

Party (PDP), local support for Jonathan was strong in the Niger Delta. Jonathan, from

the local minority ethnic group, the Ijaws, was the first Nigerian president from that

area. Informally, a union leader said that, whereas in previous strikes the Niger Delta mili-

tants offhandedly supported the fuel subsidy protesters, during 2012 the militants actively

supported Jonathan. It was reported that Jonathan ' resorted to hiring Niger Delta militants

to threaten labour union activists' in Abuja (SaharaReporters 2012).

Allegations that trade union leaders yielded to the political elites when suspending the

strike, assumes that there was a continued will and capacity to strike. Surely, there was

heavy pressure from ' influential people' to stop the protests (Lakemfa 2015 ), but according

to unionists, workers in both the formal and informal sector wanted to revert to work. In

addition to insecurity and fear spreading among workers, the strike was costly to the

unions, and both union members and informal workers were losing income (D. Yaqub, per-

sonal communication, August 30, 2012, F. Komolafe, personal communication, September

4, 2012). Remembering that workers and individual unions have historically taken to strike

action in spite of the NLC-leadership, such as in 1993/1994, the fact that on January 17 only

a handful of people turned up when some protesters tried to continue the resistance indi-

cates that the will to strike was exhausted.

Institutional power: from the street to Aso Rock

Despite systematic violations of labour rights (ITUC 2016 ), the Nigerian unions have con-

tributed to strengthening democratic processes and insisted on being party to the

decision-making of determining fuel price through the fuel subsidy strikes (Okafor

2009b). As such, the unions have incorporated associational and structural power into

institutional power: Both unions and government saw the negotiations as part of the

social dialogue (F. Komolafe, personal communication, September 4, 2012). However, insti-

tutional access carries the danger of co-optation, and a much-repeated critique of the

unions in 2012 was that they were co-opted by the state. Other protesters contested

the unions' right to negotiate, criticising the union negotiators for not consulting with

allies and accusing union leaders of being bribed (Kew and Oshikoya 2014).

Whereas Lagos was the main site of street protests, the national capital, Abuja, was the

site for closed meetings and political negotiations. The unions had dialogues with govern-

ment, the National Assembly and governors. Whereas the Governors Forum and the

Senate supported the subsidy removal, allegedly in order to release funds to the gover-

nors' budgets, the House of Representatives supported the protesters' demand to reinstall

the subsidy. Ironically, one of governors' negotiators who put pressure on the unions to

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back down was the former NLC-president, Osihomole, who owed much of his political

popularity to his role in previous subsidy protests. In addition former NUPENG President

and now a House of Representative member, Peter Akpatason (personal communication,

September 1, 2012), urged the unions to call off the strike for security reasons.

After two days of negotiations, President Jonathan announced the restoration of the

subsidy and a new pump price for fuel at 97 NGN. Both within and outside the unions,

there were voices expressing disappointment that it was not a full reversal to 65 NGN.

The fuel price change was strikingly similar to earlier strikes,

1

despite the unprecedented

mobilisation. The government had to revise the 2012-budget to include subsidy costs of

USD 4 billion (Africa Confidential 2012b ). Additionally, there were also responses to the

protest demands in relation to corruption and improvement in the downstream sector:

The House of Representatives established a probes committee to investigate corrupt prac-

tices around the subsidy, and the government pleaded with the National Assembly to pass

the long-awaited Petroleum Industrial Bill (PIB) (Lakemfa 2015).

Some protesters seemed more angered by the lack of consultation than by the

outcome (see for example Bassey 2012 ). Once government negotiations started on

January 14, tensions arose regarding questions of representation. Although civil society

was represented at the negotiations table through LASCO, the otherwise dominant

Occupy Nigeria and SNG were not included. The then acting general secretary of the

NLC, Owei Lakemfa (personal communication, September 13, 2012), pointed out that

civil society was represented by the ' goodwill of labour' . Jaiye Gaskia (personal communi-

cation, September 2, 2012) who represented civil society in LASCO at the negotiations

insisted that the decision to suspend strike negotiations was taken without them. The

NLC' s Owei Lakemfa ( 2015 ) writes that he failed to reach Gaskia on the final day, but

the other representative, Dipo Fashina was present, although Fashina, disagreed with

the decision.

When announcing the strike suspension on January 16, the unions stated 'categorically

that this new price was a unilateral one by the Government' (NLC and TUC 2012 ), and that

fuel price talks would continue. The fact that unions suspended a strike without a conclus-

ive agreement led to uncertainty and ' an uneasy calm' (Elbagir 2012 ). Frank Kokori

summarised:

If it is the type of labour I know, when the government [… ] does that type of thing with arro-

gance [unilaterally fix the price], then labour would go back, reinforce and mobilise. [… ] That is

heavy humiliation on labour. So, that is why I said, is there any juju [witchcraft] that they used

for them in Aso Rock. (quoted in Femi 2012)

In a country where corruption is commonplace, it is believable that union leaders were

'settled' . However, even if we assume that union leaders received bribes, the important

question is whether it changed the outcome of the negotiations. Kokori suggested other-

wise: ' even [if] they used Juju on Omar and Esele who were leading them, can the Juju

affect all of them? [… ] in labour, it is collectivity. Even as president or Secretary-General,

you cannot take decisions on behalf of any union.' Funmi Komolafe (personal communi-

cation, September 4, 2012), similarly proposed that the union leaders at the time were rela-

tively weak and therefore less ' bribe-worthy' , and questioned whether a bribe could water

down the strike.

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Conclusion

It is widely held that the Nigerian trade unions were instrumental to the 2012 protests.

However, non-labour activists criticised the unions' actions and strategies and suggested

that the unions had not exhausted the policy space and their capacities. By engaging with

concrete critique against the unions through labour theoretical perspectives, this article

shows how the trade unions' agency is not only potentially powerful but also inherently

constrained. This article shows how the particular mix of trade unions' external conditions,

own capacities and strategic choices open and limit opportunities, and carries inherent

tensions.

This article makes evident how the unions' in practice were instrumental in forcing the

reinstatement of the fuel subsidy through applying their associational power to organise,

mobilise, and represent; their structural power to interrupt the economy; and their insti-

tutional power to access and bargain with governance institutions. Yet, the article also

demonstrates practical and ideological constraints to unions' agency or ability to apply

these powers. In pursuing a strategy of alliance with a larger community and confronta-

tional actions towards the state, tensions arose in relation to each of their three principle

arenas, the state, the larger community and the market, reminding us that unions'priori-

ties carry inherent tensions. In relation to civil society, tensions concerned both organis-

ation, representation and policy, where in particular new actors challenged the unions'

historical role and legitimacy. The unions were not in control, and intra-protest communi-

cation was poor, both due to the composition of civil society and internal weaknesses in

the unions. The strategy of broad communal solidarity and joint social actions, contrasted

with issues of individual workers' job security, as in the case of the practical limitation of

strike action in the upstream oil industry. When moving from the street protests to political

negotiations, charges of the unions' being co-opted and bribed surfaced. This contrasts to

how unionists described negotiations and the making of concrete agreements as an exer-

cise of power. During negotiations, the unions moved away from being ' mobilisers of dis-

content' , representing protesters in confrontation with the state, to being actors of social

integration and a ' producer of social compromise'. The national insecurity situation was

underscored by calls from the streets for regime change, and in that situation, union

leaders recalled how the 1993/1994 protests backfired, paving the way for dictatorship

instead of democracy.

Note

1. For an overview, see Ibrahim and Unom (2011).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Note on contributor

Camilla Houeland is a PhD fellow at the Department of International Environment and Development

Studies, Noragric, at The Norwegian University of Life Sciences, NMBU. Her research focuses on the

opportunities and constraints to Nigerian trade union agency in the political economy of oil. As part

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN STUDIES 15

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of this research is also the article ' Casualisation and Conflict in the Niger Delta: Nigerian Oil Workers'

Unions Between Companies and Communities' (Revue Tier Monde, 2015). She can be reached at:

camilla.houeland@gmail.com.

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... However, the Norwegian union Industri Energi is not involved in either of these two countries. In the case of Brazil, most unions are progressive and militant (Houeland 2018) and reportedly do not trust the companies or the authorities. According to the union board member, "in Brazil the kind of cooperation that they have had in Tanzania would not have been possible. ...

... In the case of Nigeria, where oil workers' unions have played a critical role in the struggle for democracy (Houeland 2018), there has been no cooperation with Norwegian unions. My interlocutors in the Industri Energi union say that Equinor (then Statoil) branch representatives traveled to meet the employees in the late 1990s, but they did not succeed in establishing a platform for cooperation. ...

... Despite playing key roles in other African countries, such as Nigeria (Atabaki et al. 2018;Houeland 2018), South Africa (Webster 2018), and Zambia (Larmer 2006), unions have not played a signifi cant political role in Tanzania after the late 1970s. Th ere is lack of "solidarity and partnership" among the country's trade unions and opposition parties and trade unions blame each other for the lack of interest and unwill-ingness to cooperate (Babeiya 2011: 127, 128). ...

• Siri Lange

In the Nordic countries, unions are represented in company boards and can influence companies' policies toward labor abroad. This article focuses on the Norwegian national oil company Equinor and its support of unionization of its employees in Tanzania. This was inspired by the Nordic tradition of social dialogue between corporations and strong, independent unions. Corporation managers and union representatives tend to refer to this social dialogue as "the Norwegian model," but this is a narrow conceptualization of the model that disregards the role of the state. I argue that while it is beneficial for the Tanzanian workers to be organized, it is probably also "good for business" to have unionized workers who have adopted the Nordic collaborative model, rather than a more radical union model.

... When Jonathan removed the subsidy in 2012, the pump price rose from NGN 65 to NGN 141 overnight, with immediate effects on the costs of food, transport and medicine, all things that consumed a larger share of the poor people's incomes. In practice, fuel price increase reduces workers' purchasing power (Houeland, 2018). Fuel prices also affect employment in small and informal businesses that depend on fuel-based generators, according to Abdulwahed Omar, then president of the NLC (personal communication, 2012). ...

... Trade unions and civil society responded by threatening to strike and protest. The 1 January 2012 removal came before the conclusion of the following civil society dialogue, which further angered civil society (Houeland, 2018). ...

... By 2012, 80% of the state's revenue came from petroleum, and the subsidy removal that year came less than two weeks after a visit from IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde, who again pushed for the removal of the subsidy. The protests were a response to these limits of liberal democracy (Branch and Mampilly, 2015), and as in earlier protests, demands for cheaper fuel were interlinked with demands for deeper democracy (Houeland, 2018). ...

• Camilla Houeland

This article explores relations between popular protests and institutional politics in a petroleum-dependent economy. The 2012-protest against fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria was one of the biggest popular mobilisation in Nigeria's history, and possibly the largest in the wave of protests in Sub-Saharan Africa. This article uses perspectives of contentious politics that bridge structure and agency through a focus on relational dynamics between protests and institutional politics. This article makes four interrelated claims of how the protests are conditioned by and contribute to institutional politics: First, the protests builds on a historical trajectory of labour-led subsidy protests that in itself form part of institutionalised politics. Second, the 2012-protests were historically large due to the particular context of a decade of democracy and oil-led growth, without a popular sense economic justice and real political participation. Third, while new actors came to the scene in 2012, intra-movement fragmentation exposed trade union and civil society weaknesses and failure to build a sustained social movement. Fourth, the 2012-protests inspired civic agency and influenced institutional politics and state-citizen relations, especially reflected in party politics and elections.

... A critical factor was that the 2012 struggle brought together many different actors. Whereas protests and civic action in Nigeria are often divided across religions or communities, the 2012 protests appeared to be spontaneous, widespread, and uniting people across class and other groups, bringing union and civil society activists behind a common grievance; in this respect, these 2012 protests were like other fuel price protests in the 1980s and 1990s (Houeland 2018). ...

... The role of organised labour raises further questions about the extent to which protests empower people over energy policymaking: in three major and five minor protests analysed for the Nigeria case study, organised labour under the Nigeria Labour Congress or the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria actively involved civil society groups, and other citizens supported activist groups in mobilising members and other citizens (Houeland 2018). However, governments typically negotiated with union leaders alone, in many cases introducing new benefits for the civil servants represented by unions. ...

Energy protests are becoming increasingly common and significant around the world. While in the global North concerns tend to centre around climate issues, in the global South the concerns are more often with affordable energy. Both types of protests, however, have one issue in common: the undemocratic nature of energy policymaking. This paper draws together findings from research conducted in three countries, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan to ask how and under which conditions do struggles over energy access in fragile and conflict affected settings empower the powerless to hold public authorities to account? In exploring this theme, the study examines what factors support protests developing into significant episodes of contention within fragile settings, and whether these energy struggles promote citizen empowerment and institutional accountability.

... Uwalaka (2017) argues that labour unions did little to organise the protests. On the other hand, scholars (Hari, 2014;Houeland, 2018;Kombol, 2014) have extolled the role of labour unions in the organisation of the 2012 Occupy Nigeria protest. The 2016 protest that the same labour unions tried to organise failed. ...

... From the interviewees' comments above, there was some discomfort with this type of leadership and some respondents accused the NLC of sabotaging their efforts. This is in contrast to the results of some digital activism studies in Nigeria (Hari, 2014;Houeland, 2018;Kombol, 2014) that ascribe the success of the protest to organised labour such as the NLC and the Trade Union Congress (TUC). Such conclusions from these studies may be flawed since the NLC and TUC did not join the protest until 9 January -seven days after the first protest in Lagos. ...

• Temple Uwalaka

This paper explores the importance of leadership in the organisation of social movements in Nigeria and examines how the leadership style adopted impacted the organisation of two social movements in Nigeria. Using response from 34 semi-structured interviews from university students in Nigeria that participated in the protests, the paper finds that Leadership remains crucial to the organisation of social movements in Nigeria. Results further indicate that the leadership style adopted impacts the organisation of social movements in Nigeria, more so, than the media platform. Results also show that Techno-Enthusiasts in 2012 unlike the Nigeria Labour Congress in 2016 used their technological skills to rouse a passive generation into action. This paper concludes with a proposed leadership typology for social movement organisation in Nigeria.

... However, the opportunities offered by the agency of contentious politics have not been without difficulties. In the case of the restoration of the fuel subsidies in Nigeria, which was led by mass political mobilizations in 2012, Houeland (2018) has observed that embeddedness of labour unions in the structures of the state, markets, and the diversity of civil society raised serious questions as to whether they should be considered as "mobilisers of discontent"or "producers of social compromise". This paradox, which has been depicted by Oppong (2018) as part of a broader trend of NGOisation -the increasing institutionalization of advocacy -implicates key social actors and imposes considerable constraints to the agency afforded them through contentious politics. ...

• Nelson Oppong

From the vested interests that have held back the promulgation of Nigeria's petroleum industry for more than 17 years, to the sporadic stoppages that often frustrate attempts by the Kenyan government and Tullow Oil to truck oil from the Turkana region; grand schemes for petroleum resources often get entangled in a complex web of contentious politics. Nonetheless, the basic instinct of the predominant literature on oil governance has been to confine these contentious processes to the 'black box' of elite consolidation. Based on an in-depth account of the distinctive political economy drivers of reform in Ghana's oil industry and the complement of Abdul Raufu Mustapha's interpretation of the 'multi-ple publics' governing Africa's public sphere, this article offers a pushback against this dominant narrative. It argues that the constitutive processes that drive institutional and policy reform reflect the impulses of contentious politics, instead of elite reflexes.

• Camilla Houeland

The purpose of this thesis is to explore trade union agency and its limits in an African country that is highly dependent on oil. The overall research question is: What are the opportunities and constraints to trade union agency in Nigeria? This case study of the Nigerian trade unions focuses on the 2012 fuel subsidy protests that constituted among the biggest popular mobilisations in Nigerian history. Many of the Nigerian trade unions' achievements over the last decades relate to their leading role in the recurring and successful resistance against fuel subsidy removals. This is widely recognised, but insufficiently understood, and the unions are both over- and under-estimated in terms of their capacities. The thesis addresses a research gap on African trade unions. It is motivated by an apparent paradox. On one hand, are theoretical dismissals of the relevance of trade unions, in assuming that there is a limited civic agency and space for trade unions in African states and in petro-economies. On the other, are reports of widespread labour rights abuses from many African governments and employers, undoubtedly due to the significance of the unions. Additionally, whereas emerging studies of civic agency in Africa tend to focus on relatively disempowered groups and informal labour, the focus on the strategically positioned trade unions into the analysis opens for a renewed conversation about state–society relations, the constitution of power and discussions about the capacities of social actors to engage with structures. Theoretically, the thesis engages with the concepts of agency and power. Power is understood as inherent properties or capacities of an actor, while agency concerns the subjective, reflexive and purposeful realisation of these capacities. Agency is further considered as relational, contextual and historical. In understanding the unions' contexts and relations, the thesis emphasises a holistic understanding of labour's multiple roles and relations in what I have called the 'labour triangle': state, market and society. Methodologically I have used an extended case method, which is reflexive in nature, combines fieldwork and interviews with theoretical explorations, and implies moving between scales and levels. As agency is rooted in history, the introductory chapter emphasises the specific historical formation of state, market and society in Nigeria. The Nigerian state is characterised by prebendal elite politics, a federalised and divided governance system with divisions according to regions and ethnicities, as well as parallel social logics of the civic and the 'primordial' publics. The unions are rooted in a modern, civic public. Although the state has attempted to control the unions, they operate largely autonomously. The Nigerian economy is dominated by oil and a large informal sector, and there are deep class divisions horizontally, between the haves and the have-nots; the elites and the popular masses. Additionally, there are social divisions vertically in terms of ethnicity, religion and region. Although these divisions have at times disturbed union efficiency and the relevance of class identity for mobilisation, the unions largely cut through these separations. Within the unions, ideological divisions between radical and reformist are more prominent. While the oil resources have fuelled the distanced relationship between state and citizen, a growing sense of injustice caused by the lack of redistribution and of popular benefits from the oil resources has been a source for trade unions' mobilising power. This, together with the workers' strategic position in the oil economy, allows the unions a particularly strong structural power. The thesis consists of three articles. The first article – Nigerian unions between the street and Aso Rock: The role of the Nigerian trade unions in the 2012 fuel subsidy protests – critically examines the trade unions' contested positions and actions during the 2012 protests. Whereas unionists described the outcome as a victory and demonstration of popular sovereignty, fellow protesters expressed anger towards the unions for unfulfilled democratic opportunities and accused the unions of succumbing to bribery. The article shows in practice how the unions' capacities to mobilise, strike and negotiate were instrumental in the reinstatement of the subsidy, and also how the unions' agency is both enabled and constrained by their embeddedness in the state, society and the market. The second article – Casualisation and conflict in the Niger Delta: Nigerian oil workers' unions between companies and communities – explores the particular opportunities and constraints to organised oil workers' actions. Although the 2012 fuel subsidy protests mobilised an unprecedented number of people on the streets, the government did not call for negotiations until the oil unions threatened to shut down oil production. However, production was never shut down, and the oil unions were criticised for 'empty threats' and for abandoning their historical democratic and social role. Based on the premise that the conditions for labour actions are found at the local and industrial workplace levels, the paper explores how processes of informalisation of labour (casualisation) and conflict interlink and affect the local labour regime and the oil unions' powers in the Niger Delta. It shows how the labour fragmentations and erosions of labour power from casualisation are exacerbated when unfolding into this context of conflict and social fragmentation. Despite the oil unions' strategic position in the oil industry and their relatively high union density, these processes have challenged both their capacity and will to mobilise, strike and bargain. The third article – Popular protest against fuel subsidy removal: Nigerian trade unions as mediator of a social contract – explores the popular idea that cheap fuel is an economic right for Nigerian citizens, and is part of a social contract. In contrast to perspectives that underscore the lack of civic opportunities in the relations between the state and its citizens in Nigeria, the article proposes that the protesters asserted and claimed deeper citizenship. They did so by rallying behind the fuel subsidy as a social right, and also by utilising civil rights to bargain and political rights to participate. Here, the trade unions played a critical and mediating role, based in their specific industrial citizenship, with collective forms of representation, organising and bargaining. This social contract is fragile however, and the unions' roles as mediators of this social contract are both critical and contested. In addition to expanding our understanding of an African trade union in an oil-dependent economy, this thesis opens for a renewed conversation about state–society relations, power and agency. Whereas agency studies from Africa have focused on relatively powerless actors and the tactical agency of getting by, studying the agency of the relatively powerful unions reveals their ability to influence the surrounding structures. Trade unions have strategic powers in relation to state, market and society in their ability to mobilise socially, hurt the economy through strike action and negotiate with elites in state and market. This allows them to play a far greater role than their relative size suggests. Although Nigeria is among the most difficult countries for unions to operate in, the Nigerian trade unions have contributed to ensuring social benefits to Nigerians through cheap fuel, and they have been a counterforce to the expansion of informal and patronage relations at the workplace. They have additionally contributed to strengthening civic relations and state institutions through a mediating role between state and citizen. The study clearly shows the need to engage with trade unions in the study of power and politics in Africa.

• Kenneth Nwoko

The Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) has, since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, been the platform for the Nigerian people to query government policies, actions and inaction, not only for the Nigerian working class, but the entire Nigerian peoples. Such policies include: privatization and commercialization of public institutions and services, incessant fuel hikes, retrenchments of workers and implementation of prescribed conditions and unfavourable policies of international monopoly finance capitalist institutions, etc. This paper investigates the activities of the Nigeria Labour Congress, as a credible opposition to the ruling party in Nigeria. It examines the conditions that necessitated this additional responsibility on the NLC as well as the nexus between credible opposition and workers' welfarism. The paper argues that the emergence of the Labour Party in the country's political landscape and its relative acceptance is underpinned by the functionality of its platform as the "mouthpiece of the masses."

• Ebenezer Obadare
• Wale Adebanwi

In the very first week of January 2012, with the New Year's air still redolent of the odor of the previous year, major towns and cities across Nigeria exploded in spontaneous civic rage. The immediate provocation was President Goodluck Jonathan's announcement of the federal government's resolve to remove the "remaining" subsidy on petroleum products distributed in the country. With that seemingly irreversible decision, the pump price of petrol was to rise from 65 to 41 per liter, an increase of more than 100 percent. Earlier, as 2011 drew to a tense close (parts of the north and the federal capital, Abuja, had been rocked by deadly bomb blasts for which the radical Islamic group, Boko Haram-Western education is sacrilegious, had taken responsibility), major Nigerian newspapers gave conflicting reports on the status of negotiations between the federal government and representatives of the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC). On the one hand, it appeared that the NLC was willing to concede to subsidy removal at a certain percentage, but not until government had demonstrated good faith by committing itself to investment in long neglected physical infrastructure, especially Nigeria's aging and perennially damaged oil refineries. For its part, the federal government, in an all too familiar pseudo-Weberian grandstanding, trotted out data that appeared to support its claim that subsidy removal was imperative if an oil industry in its last throes was to be resuscitated.

• Edward Webster
• R. Lambert
• A. Bezuidenhout

Widespread claims have been made on the emergence of a new labour internationalism in response to the growing insecurity created by globalisation. This book grounds globalisation in the everyday lives of workers, their households, and their communities . It compares three towns- Orange in Australia, Changwon in South Korea, and Ezakheni in South Africa - and shows how the global restructuring of white gods corporations is creating a profound experience of insecurity within workers, their families, and their communities. The book contains a warning; at times , workers do turn inward and become fatalistic , even xenophobic. But their are also signs of hope. The book explores the possibilities of re-empowering labour through engaging space and scale in new ways, Workers are rising to the challenge of neoliberal globalisation by attempting to globalise their own struggles.

• Darren Kew

African nations have watched the recent civic dramas of the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street asking if they too will see similar civil society actions in their own countries. Nigeria-Africa's most populous nation-has long enjoyed one of the continent's most vibrant civil society spheres, which has been instrumental in political change. Initially viewed as contributing to democracy's development, however, civil society groups have come under increased scrutiny by scholars and policymakers. Do some civil society groups promote democracy more effectively than others? And if so, which ones, and why? By examining the structure, organizational cultures, and methods of more than one hundred Nigerian civil society groups, Kew finds that the groups that best promote democratic development externally are themselves internally democratic. Specifically, the internally democratic civil society groups build more sustainable coalitions to resist authoritarian rule; support and influence political parties more effectively; articulate and promote public interests in a more negotiable fashion; and, most importantly, inculcate democratic norms in their members, which in turn has important democratizing impacts on national political cultures and institutions. Further, internally democratic groups are better able to resolve ethnic differences and ethnic-based tensions than their undemocratically structured peers. This book is a deeply comprehensive account of Nigerian civil society groups in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Kew blends democratic theory with conflict resolution methodologies to argue that the manner in which groups-and states-manage internal conflicts provides an important gauge as to how democratic their political cultures are. The conclusions will allow donors and policymakers to make strategic decisions in their efforts to build a democratic society in Nigeria and other regions.

• Omolade Adunbi

The idea that neoliberalism is about shrinking the state to make it more effective has often translated to what many have called the "outsourcing" of state responsibilities to NGOs. This article investigates the growing influence of NGOs and NGO practices in Nigeria, while also illustrating Nigerian NGO connections to transnational networks of human rights NGOs. It maps the genealogies of two Nigerian NGOs, CLEEN and CISLAC, through the rise of their leaders. I argue that the culture of NGO practices is emblematic of how neoliberalism loathes the state in ways that privilege NGOs as alternatives to the state. I use this article to think through the following questions: how is it that NGOs engage in claim-making that imbues practitioners with knowledge aimed at reshaping structures of power? Why do NGOs demonize nation-state governance structures perceived as alien and backward? How is it that structures of governance shaped by neoliberal practices are claimed, normalized, and imbibed by NGOs as practices that are modern? These practices, I argue, are illustrative of how the culture of human rights has and continues to transform power structures in Nigeria. © 2016 by the Institute for Ethnographic Research (IFER) a part of The George Washington University. All rights reserved.

• Jane I. Guyer
• LaRay Denzer

The strength of the concept of prebendalism is that it focuses on "fundamental processes" (Joseph 1987, 1) of political sociology by suggesting that access between the people and the state may show broad similarities across time, space, and regime type. In his conclusion, written just after the return of the military to power in Nigeria, Richard Joseph asks, using the experience of the Second Republic, how multiparty democracy can be sustained if it "only generates patterns of political mobilization and conflict which threaten the very integrity of the nation itself" (184), by reaffirming officeholding as the focus of competition: "the intensive and persistent struggle to control and exploit the offices of the state" (1). Different kinds of pluralistic democracy, as well as military rule, may sustain familiar patterns of the circulation of funds and goods through the arteries and capillaries of the distribution of state resources. In principle, Joseph's approach opens a vast field for comparative studies, of which one key empirical topic would be the actualities of government procurement through the offices of the state, otherwise known in Nigeria as "contracting," which exists in every modern government system, without exception. Such empirical studies seem much rarer than they ought to be. For example, is there a study of how bids and tenders work for the provision of boots for the army, given that Nigeria has a shoe industry of its own (Meagher 2010, 46, 125)?

• Björn Beckman

Scholars (primarily, but not only, from Europe) are naturally enough preoccupied with the historical role of labour movements and their ability to sustain their political influence on state power through the close link between unions and the political wing of the movement, whether social- democratic, socialist, or communist. Are working-class-based and trade- union-backed political parties the solution to the 'democratic problem' in much of the world today? Some of us feel that we have good reasons to think so. The notion of a labour movement seems to break out of the straitjacket imposed by those who want us to choose between parliaments and civil society. By allowing itself to be located at the very centre of the political society, it dissolves the state-society division that has been popularised by liberal and neo-liberal theory.

• C. J. Campbell

Nigeria covers 930,000 km2, extending from the deserts of the north, which border the Sahara, to tropical rain forests of the south. Most of the country is relatively flat-lying with rivers flowing through shallow valleys in extensive plains, although more mountainous terrain builds in the south on the border with the Cameroons. The country is drained by the Niger and Benue rivers, which converge in an extensive delta of freshwater swamps and mangroves. With 162 million inhabitants, it is the most populous country in Africa, also having one of the highest population densities. Lagos, the capital, is home to some eight million people. Nigeria joined OPEC in 1971, and has played a prominent part in the organisation.

• T. Falola
• M.M. Heaton

Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and the world's eighth largest oil producer, but its success has been undermined in recent decades by ethnic and religious conflict, political instability, rampant official corruption and an ailing economy. Toyin Falola, a leading historian intimately acquainted with the region, and Matthew Heaton, who has worked extensively on African science and culture, combine their expertise to explain the context to Nigeria's recent troubles through an exploration of its pre-colonial and colonial past, and its journey from independence to statehood. By examining key themes such as colonialism, religion, slavery, nationalism and the economy, the authors show how Nigeria's history has been swayed by the vicissitudes of the world around it, and how Nigerians have adapted to meet these challenges. This book offers a unique portrayal of a resilient people living in a country with immense, but unrealized, potential.

Source: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320709536_Between_the_street_and_Aso_Rock_the_role_of_Nigerian_trade_unions_in_popular_protests

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